Check for updates

Original Article

HHS

History of the Human Sciences
1–23
© The Author(s) 2020
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/0952695120965506
journals.sagepub.com/home/hhs
SAGE

Ideology and science: The story of Polish psychology in the communist period

Leszek Koczanowicz
SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Poland

Iwona Koczanowicz-Dehnel
Wrocław University, Poland

Abstract

This article presents a fragment of the history of psychology in Poland, discussing its development in the years 1945–56, which saw sweeping political and geographical transformations. In that maelstrom of history, psychology was particularly affected by the effects of geopolitical changes, which led to its symbolic 'arrest' in 1952, when psychological practice was prohibited and all psychology courses were abolished at universities. Amnesty was declared only in 1956, with the demise of the so-called Stalinist 'cult of personality' and the onset of a turbulent period when the crimes of the Stalinist era were prosecuted. We have adopted three time frames for our description and analysis of this dramatic period in the development of psychology in Poland. 'The past' is a story about the flourishing of Polish psychology before World War Two and the hopes for the discipline's restoration after the war. 'The present', as the core of this narrative, represents the events of 1950–56. 'The future' refers to the period when Stalinist abuses were prosecuted during the Thaw, following the collapse of the Stalinist dictatorship, and the resurgence of Polish psychologists' hopes for resurrecting their discipline. In all these periods, the narrative is interwoven with the story of the Polish psychologist Mieczysław Kreutz, who offers a model example of the hypothesized dependence of scientific research on sociopolitical change.

Keywords

Lvov-Warsaw school, Polish psychology, science, Soviet psychology, totalitarianism

Corresponding author:
Leszek Koczanowicz, SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Department of Cultural Studies, Ostrowskiego 30b, Wrocław 53-238, Poland.
Email: lkoczanowicz@swps.edu.pl

Introduction: Psychology and totalitarian ideology

The political changes in the late 1970s brought about a change in the perception of psychology's past. What allowed psychologists to explore new ways of developing their discipline was a break with the historiographical tradition based on such notions as the 'great man' or the 'historical date', which envisioned a continuous sequence of the discipline's triumphs in its quest for truth. The work of researchers such as Kurt Danziger (1990, 1994, 1997), Mitchell G. Ash (1995), Roger Smith (1988, 1997), Graham Richards (1987, 2010), Martin Kusch (1999), Laurel Furumoto (1989, 1995), and many others laid the foundation for a new perspective on the history of psychology, which Furumoto (1989: 18) dubbed 'the New History of Psychology'. One aspect of the new perspective on the history of psychology as a discipline was to highlight a number of previously neglected issues, ones that challenged the traditional descriptions of the discipline's progress. The development of psychology in fact appears to have been a series of non-linear changes, with periods of cumulative growth alternating with times of stagnation or even regression. Furthermore, the history of psychology is believed to have been determined not only by the internal logic of its development but also by the impact of external factors, such as politics, culture, and ideology.

A paradigmatic example of this influence is the entanglement of psychology and ideology, which was particularly evident in the era of totalitarianism, when the discipline was implicated in the propagandist promotion of political tenets (Geuter, 1992: 6). Such a collision of politics and ideology, on the one hand, and psychology, on the other, took place in Nazi Germany and the Stalinist Soviet Union. Without going into the nuances and complexities of how the Nazi and Stalinist states differed and how they were similar, we want only to highlight that in both of them the state apparatus had an enormous and often decisive impact on the development of science and the lives of scholars (Amsterdamski, 1989; Bratus, 2011; Graham, 1987, 1993; Josephson, 1988; Krementsov and deJong-Lambert, 2017; Lecourt, 2003[1977]; Mandler, 2008; Pollock, 2006).

The purpose of this article is to outline the relationship between psychology and ideology in Poland during the Stalinist period. To plunge into 'the middle of the historic moment' of the development of Polish psychology in 1945–56, we have adopted three time frames to structure our narrative. 'The past' refers to the pre-war period and the immediate aftermath of World War Two (1945–50), 'the present' concerns the period of the 'arrest' of psychology (1950–6), and 'the future' represents the period of the Thaw brought about by political changes that followed the collapse of Stalinism. To fulfil this task, we refer mainly to published primary sources – journal articles, books, and conference materials – as well as to some archival sources, especially to the archives of Wrocław University. The use of three time frames enables us to treat the communist period in the history of psychology in Poland as essentially an autonomous entity, which included its own past, present, and future. The end of communism in 1989 was a closure that opened a new cognitive horizon.

Our narrative thus corresponds to the key periods of post-war Poland. The first of these (the past) spans from 1945 to 1949, when Poland fell under the influence of the Soviet Union. Despite the enforced dominance of the Communist Party, a limited pluralism was still countenanced in the public sphere and research. The humanities and the

social sciences continued their pre-war projects and pursuits, albeit while facing increasing political and ideological pressures (Chmielewski and Koczanowicz, 1997). In the second period (the present), lasting from 1949 to 1956, the Communist Party became the dominant political force, as it practically monopolized the political and ideological spheres. This entailed, among other things, a reorientation of the humanities and the social sciences, with an often simplified version of a Marxist framework ubiquitously imposed. Finally, in 1956, as de-Stalinization in the Soviet Union progressed and anti-communist protests by workers in Poland intensified, a political breakthrough took place in Poland (which we refer to as 'the future'). The Communist Party retained its dominant political and ideological position, but a degree of carefully controlled pluralism was allowed in the public sphere. The ideological pressure on the humanities and the social sciences was largely lifted; however, a series of drastic interventions in these fields did take place in this period. The most significant of these was a campaign launched against 'revisionists' and 'Zionists', which resulted in an ideological cleansing at many Polish universities. The late 1970s and 1980s marked a period of the total corrosion of simplified Marxism as the official ideology of the state, leading ultimately to the dismantling of the communist regime in 1989.

Throughout these three narrative time frames, the binding framework for the story of the (mis)fortunes of Polish psychology will be provided by the work of the eminent psychologist and philosopher Mieczysław Kreutz. Kreutz was involved in all the developments recounted above: he contributed to the rise of psychology in the pre-war period, was actively involved in efforts to rebuild the discipline just after the war, and, as a representative of idealistic psychology and the only surviving prominent practitioner of pre-war psychological scholarship, became a target of the sharpest criticism in 1950–6. He also played an important role in the restoration of psychology in Poland after 1956, when the Stalinist injustices were prosecuted.

The past: Psychology in Poland in the interwar period and in the aftermath of World War Two

In the years 1918–39, psychology in Poland enjoyed a period of rapid development. The surge of enthusiasm after the regaining of independent statehood on 11 November 1918 also propelled efforts to form structures of scholarship and research in the newly free country, which had previously been partitioned between Austria, Germany, and Russia. In this article, we are interested predominantly in the stabilization of psychology as part of the overall process of developing Polish science.

The necessary theoretical, methodological, and human resources were provided by the University of Lvov, where Kazimierz Twardowski and his disciples had developed psychological scholarship in the Department of Philosophy since the end of the 19th century. The special relevance of the Lvov-Warsaw School to the development of Polish science is discussed below in the section devoted to Kreutz. Psychology as a discipline was studied and taught at the universities of Warsaw, Cracow, Poznań, Lvov, and Vilnius. These centres were involved in psychological research, developed psychology courses and degree programmes, and launched psychology journals. The best known of these journals were (and still are!) *Kwartalnik Psychologiczny* (the *Psychological*

Quarterly) and *Psychologia Wychowawcza* (*Educational Psychology*), which published articles authored by Polish and foreign psychologists, and discussed the latest publications in English, German, and French. Polish psychologists at that time maintained close ties with scientists abroad, participated in international conferences, and used a system of scholarship programmes.

The major research focus in this period was the study of psychological experiences by means of introspection. A lot of importance was also attached to tests, and efforts were made to adapt the existing scales to the Polish setting and to devise original tests. Vitally, this period was characterized by an openness to diverse currents and the avoidance of any dogmatic take on their potential utility to psychology. Psychoanalysis as an approach to understanding mental illness is one such example: generally speaking, it was not a part of the mainstream of academic psychology, but its categories and methods sometimes became the subject of the articles published in academic journals (Dybel, 2016). For example, *Psychologia Wychowawcza* published an article on the Rorschach method by Lydia Apołczyn (1938) with a foreword by Kreutz. Kreutz was not a supporter either of projective tests or of the psychology of the unconscious, but he certainly discerned a psychotechnical potential in approaches other than the psychology of consciousness, writing, 'Employing this method in practice, but not relying on it exclusively, can undoubtedly do great service both to psychotechnical research and to educational work' (Kreutz, 1938: 23).

World War Two inevitably interrupted this work, as universities were closed down by the German occupiers and many scientists were murdered or died as a result of dismal living conditions. These events were described in volume 12 of *Kwartalnik Psychologiczny*, published two years after the war in 1947, with a foreword in which editor-in-chief Stefan Błachowski summarized the preceding eight years, beginning with the publication of issue 1 – which had been released, as a matter of fact, in the early spring of 1939. Issue 2 had already been printed in the summer before the war, and was waiting in the printing house for distribution. However, as Błachowski (1947: vii) described, 'When the Germans came to Poznań and launched their attrition battle to wipe out all traces of Polish culture from the face of the city, the entire volume 12 of *Kwartalnik Psychologiczny* fell victim to their murderous rage'. For this reason, the editors decided that volume 12 should go down in history as unfinished.

The war decimated the academic community; many psychologists did not live to see the liberation. As naming all the psychologists who had not survived the war was very difficult, Błachowski listed only those who were direct collaborators of *Kwartalnik Psychologiczny*. The list included as many as 20 names, which aroused concerns about whether psychology could be rebuilt at all as an academic discipline in the near future. Therefore, every effort was made to establish a degree course in psychology as soon as possible. In May 1946, a conference of university psychologists took place in Cracow, attended by a delegate of the Ministry of Education. The participants developed draft regulations for MA exams in psychology to define the discipline as a research field separate from academic philosophy. The proposal was accepted by the psychological community and, most importantly, by the Ministry of Education. This kindled hopes that an ordinance on the status of psychology would be issued shortly.

The 1946 proposal envisaged the establishment of three specializations within a regular degree programme in psychology: applied psychology, social psychology, and the psychology of animals. A student interested in any of these specializations would have the right to transfer to an academic centre that focused on it. Of course, the programme needed to be developed from scratch, because all the pre-war infrastructure had been destroyed. Błachowski mentions the obliteration of buildings, libraries, tests, and test equipment in all the pre-war academic centres. To illustrate how enormous the losses were to Polish academia, we might mention that, for example, the Department of Psychology at the University of Warsaw was destroyed by bombing, and the fire destroyed books and equipment that had been accumulated over 20 years of pre-war independence. The same fate befell the Department of Experimental Psychology at the Jagiellonian University, where only 200 books were saved from the entire library collection. At Poznań, equipment and teaching aids also went up in flames. As Błachowski (1947: 12) wrote, 'An impressive collection of journals was burned: journals obtained in the exchange scheme *Kwartalnik Psychologiczny* had had with psychological journals all over the world'.

As a result of geopolitical changes and, more directly, the Treaty of Yalta, Poland lost its eastern territories, including two large academic centres in Vilnius and Lvov. Psychology had been developed in both of these before the war, and Lvov had been, in a sense, a cradle of at least two generations of psychologists. Researchers from Lvov were now tasked with forming the structures of higher education in the western territories, which Poland had obtained by way of compensation for the loss of the eastern areas. In particular, their mission involved founding a university in the former German city of Breslau (now Wrocław). Responsibility for the establishment of psychology at this university was given to the previously mentioned Mieczysław Kreutz. Again, Kreutz had to build his department from the ground up, because the university buildings had been destroyed in the fierce assault launched by the German army in the last months of the war. The former local university's library had survived the conflagration of war, but it housed only German books and journals.

In short, very little was left from the successfully developing pre-war field of psychology, but in 1946 the survivors' enthusiasm was so immense that they immediately started reproducing the pre-war structures of research and teaching. The Polish Psychological Society was reactivated; its aim was to consolidate the community of psychologists, researchers, and practitioners, and to promote psychology by, among other methods, arranging the publication of books and journals. In the years 1946–7, the publication of *Psychologia Wychowawcza* and *Kwartalnik Psychologiczny* was resumed, and an attempt was made to reactivate *Psychotechnics* which was a journal devoted to problems of applied psychology. Concluding his article on the period between the publication of volumes 12 and 13, Błachowski insisted with deep gratitude that whatever had been done to further the development of psychology had been made possible by the support of the Ministry of Education.

Volume 13 was thematically divided into articles written before and after the war. The pre-war articles discussed issues related to psychological experiences, as in 'On Knowing Other People's Mental States' by Roman Ingarden (1947), the most eminent Polish phenomenologist, which provided a thorough analysis of direct experience constituting

another person's mental reality. Tadeusz Zaworski (1947) reported the findings of his research on 'Acoustic Eidetic Representations'. His study was innovative because, at the time, international psychology dealt mainly with visual eidetism (the ability to hold and reproduce a mental image of a scene or object after the direct perception of that scene or object had ended), and there were no discussions of acoustic eidetism in the literature. From the 'pool of pre-war psychology', volume 13 of *Kwartalnik Psychologiczny* also featured an article by Józef Reutt (1947) titled 'The Definition of Goal vs. Behaviour', devoted to the psychology of will. Reutt's research was underpinned largely by the concept of human will developed by the German psychologist Narziss Ach, who recognized will as a type of inner experience. Reutt is discussed in more detail below in connection with his work on 'new psychology'.

'New psychology' was represented in 1947 by Tadeusz Tomaszewski, whose nearly 60-page-long article ended volume 13. The title and subject of the article concerned the development of psychology in the USSR. At the beginning of 'On Psychology in the Soviet Union' (Tomaszewski, 1947), it was clearly emphasized that Soviet psychology had been falsely portrayed both in pre-war Poland and in the world at large. All the more so because, according to Tomaszewski, the development of Soviet psychology proceeded in three stages. The first stage covered the period from the October Revolution in 1917 to, roughly, 1924. It was defined by a search for a new model of psychology based on dialectical materialism. At that time, Pavlov, a world-renowned physiologist and the founder of the classical conditioning method, was an active researcher.

The second stage of the development of Soviet psychology comprised the years 1924–30, a period that, in Tomaszewski's assessment, was marked by unsuccessful attempts to find a 'new psychology'. The attempts failed because Bechterov's reflexology was, essentially, just another version of behaviourism, 'one of the most primitive forms of materialism in psychology' (Tomaszewski, 1947: 269). Another theory – reactology, as formulated by Kornilov (Graham, 1987: 164–5) – was a system explaining mental phenomena by means of the stimulus–response model. This, according to Tomaszewski, represented a fusion of two utterly non-Marxist concepts – behaviourism and physiological psychology – into one psychological framework based on the principles of dialectical materialism. The last, and obviously unsuccessful, attempt to create a new psychology was then undertaken by Vygotsky (Graham 1993: 103–8; Jovanović, 2015). Vygotsky combined the notion of natural biological development with the concept of cultural development, which he viewed as autonomous and subject to the laws of progress. That, in Tomaszewski's view, brought Vygotsky closer to mainstream idealistic currents. The stalemate in which Soviet psychology found itself required completely new ways of fitting psychology into the formula of dialectical materialism.

The third and final stage of the history of psychology in the USSR thus began from a wave of criticism of the contemporary theory and practice of psychology, on which Tomaszewski diligently reported when writing about the closing of psychotechnical institutes, the elimination of jobs for school psychologists, the destruction of tests and surveys, and the criticism of Western psychology. However, in his view, this was only a temporary episode, because 'this momentary collapse of psychology in the Soviet Union already contained the seeds of its rebirth' (Tomaszewski, 1947: 271). At this point, we should add that Tomaszewski emphasized the unity of the system of dialectical sciences,

based on the fact that a small set of philosophical assertions of dialectical materialism was the basis for recasting the sciences, which would lead to 'the construction of *summa scientiarum* for the first time in a very long time. In the field of psychology, this process has already gone quite far' (ibid.: 315).

The past: Mieczysław Kreutz as a representative of the Lvov-Warsaw School of psychology

Tomaszewski, who outlined the principles of new psychology, was a student of our article's protagonist, Mieczysław Kreutz, who in turn was a disciple of Twardowski, an eminent philosopher and the founder of the Lvov-Warsaw School. The school has become famous worldwide due mainly to such outstanding logicians as Jan Łukasiewicz and Alfred Tarski, but it also produced psychologists who started their careers as Twardowski's doctoral students.[1]

Kreutz (1893–1971) was one of those scholars. A Polish psychologist and methodologist, he studied at the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Lvov in 1911–14. With the onset of World War One, he was drafted into the Austrian army, and after Poland regained independence, he fought in the ranks of the Polish army. Released from service in November 1920 as a captain, he started working as an assistant professor in the Department of Psychology at the University of Lvov. Having obtained his PhD in 1924, he received a scholarship, which he used to finance research internships in Berlin, Leipzig, Hamburg, and Paris. The scholarship visits resulted in a habilitation thesis titled *On the Variability of Test Results*. In 1928, after Twardowski retired, Kreutz was appointed head of the Department of Psychology at the University of Lvov.

Kreutz worked at the University of Lvov until the end of June 1941. After the outbreak of the war between Germany and the Soviet Union and the closure of the university by the German occupation authorities, Kreutz took a job as a teacher in a Polish school for kindergarten teachers. However, the school was also soon closed. To earn a living, Kreutz was forced to serve as a louse-feeder in a factory producing anti-typhus vaccines.

After World War Two, together with a group of professors from Lvov, Kreutz worked on establishing a Polish University of Wrocław on the ruins of the German university in the city. Kreutz actively participated in developing a psychology programme and organized a research and teaching facility that became the Department of Psychology. In a short time, he found students willing to do their master's degrees in psychology. He also worked to disseminate psychological knowledge among teachers. Unfortunately, the thriving development of psychology and Kreutz's robust activity did not last long, since as early as 1952, policies were launched to completely eliminate any institutional forms of the teaching and study of psychology at the University of Wrocław. By government decree, Kreutz was transferred to the Institute of Philosophy and Social Sciences, part of the Department of General Psychology at the University of Warsaw.[2] At the time, this was the only institutional centre at which research in psychology could be done.

Kreutz was interested in the object and methods of psychological research. His publications were clearly inspired by Twardowski. In his 1949 book titled *Podstawy psychologii* (Foundations of Psychology), Kreutz defined conscious phenomena as the proper object for psychology and, therefore, introspection as a basic method of research.

He used the term 'basic method' to highlight that this was a direct method that entailed perceiving mental phenomena the way they were brought into our consciousness. To understand their mental life, people did not need any additional senses. Kreutz regarded the defence of the introspective method to be the mission of any researcher concerned about psychology losing its true object of study. Kreutz insisted that it was only through introspection that we could gain an overview of our mental experiences and know what content might appear to us. Most importantly, he regarded the data gained from introspection as the basis for applying indirect methods.

The latter were very significant in psychology, because they were objective. According to Kreutz, their objectivity resided in the fact that the tested phenomenon became available in its external form to a larger number of researchers simultaneously. By the same token, this expanded the field of psychological research, but the study of indirect methods was always secondary to introspection. This meant that without introspection there would be no psychology. Attempts to completely eliminate introspection had been undertaken by behaviourists, but unsuccessfully, in Kreutz's view. As he stated:

> I believe that the presentation of the main principles of this movement [behaviourism] and the results obtained by it can serve as an excellent defense of introspection and convince the unbiased ones that, despite its many real defects and deficiencies, introspection is indispensable for psychology and for the entirety of human knowledge, as it aims to provide a full picture of reality. (Kreutz, 1949: 35)

To defend introspection as a research method, Kreutz insisted on organizing and structuring test procedures, given that, as he rightly pointed out, the method was used very freely in psychology. To some extent, such rigour was also intended to help introspection to approximate the strict principles of the natural sciences, and thus verify the results obtained by indirect methods. In the use of introspection, the most important step was the last, when more introspective insights were gathered and analysed by the researcher according to the rules of logic and general methodology. This could exonerate introspective data from accusations of being unscientific.

Kreutz's argument in defence of introspection was based largely on the idea that an individual introspective proposition did not have the status of a scientific judgement because it did not meet the basic criterion of verifiability. Given this, we could not accept its truthfulness – but nor were there any grounds to reject it. This was because 'individual judgments are only research material, using which the researcher discovers and formulates certain laws, in other words, relationships between the studied phenomena' (Kreutz, 1949: 58). All sciences aimed to produce general laws, and so did psychology. General laws formulated on the basis of a larger number of introspective responses were verifiable, which gives them the status of scientific claims. To sum up, the defence of introspection in Kreutz's theory was grounded in the recognition of the validity of general introspective insights, founded on a considerable quantity of individual judgements.

The second issue that absorbed Kreutz was criticism of the testing method. According to him, the most serious objection to tests was the inconsistency of their results. The problem was that when a test was repeatedly administered to the same individual, the results obtained could be quite different. In 1923, Kreutz conducted a series of tests that confirmed his theoretical assumptions about the variability of test results. The study used an immediate memory test borrowed from Binet and Simon's Intelligence Scale, and lasted a total of eight weeks. The participants were students of the University of Lvov who attended a course on experimental psychology. The test conditions were the same each time: the test date was always Wednesday, at 7 p.m., and the venue was always the lecture hall. The test was repeated three times during one meeting.

Kreutz thus obtained sufficient data to draw further conclusions about the reliability of tests. His preliminary analysis already showed a large variation in the test results for the same participant, which called into serious question the practice of one-time application of a test in a study. This raised doubts about how

> to assess the degree of memory on the basis of several largely different results. You cannot select one of them and consider it an indicator of memory, because we do not have any data that could justify selecting some and rejecting other results, especially since the choice will enormously change the evaluation. Consequently, researchers usually calculate the arithmetic average of their results, although this cannot be sufficiently justified and is an arbitrary solution. (Kreutz, 1949: 141)

The variability of test results was attributed firstly to internal factors, such as the subjects' dispositions, and secondly to phenomenological inconsistencies, that is, between internal and external experiences. More specifically, the latter category included physiological factors, such as the respondent's current health status: their body temperature, blood pressure, cardiac functions, and so on. According to Kreutz, test results were also essentially affected by the physical characteristics of the venue: lighting, room temperature, atmospheric pressure, and the quality of the resources and tools used in testing. Internal aspects of the experience included the emotional, motivational, and intellectual state of the person while taking the test.

Kreutz's proposal for solving the problem of variable test results was to establish upper and lower limits for test result variability. This involved designing, for each test, all possible combinations of variability conditions that could positively or negatively affect the obtained result. This was to enable researchers to determine a result that Kreutz called the maximum result, which was the result obtained in the most favourable conditions. According to Kreutz (1949: 303), 'Practically speaking, I believe that in a series of results, the best result is a value more similar than any other to the true measure of the degree of the disposition, and that by adopting it as a measure of disposition, we make a lesser mistake as compared with the errors we would commit accepting any other result'.

All of Kreutz's critical comments about the testing method were designed to eliminate the shortcomings of this method as perceived by the researcher himself, because he felt that tests had a great future in psychology. Their main advantage was objectivity, and they made it possible to clearly determine what was being tested and by which

test. This helped psychologists to avoid many misunderstandings when interpreting a given study.

The present: A methodological crisis or an ideological crisis?

The editors of the first issue of *Przegląd Psychologiczny* (the *Psychological Review*) in 1952 pursued three main objectives: firstly, to foster the rebuilding of Polish psychological thinking based on the theoretical foundations of Marxism, which had already been carried out in an exemplary fashion in Soviet psychology; secondly, to engage Polish psychologists in vast socialist construction projects, especially in the implementation of the six-year plan; and thirdly, to actively involve psychologists in transforming the Polish nation into a socialist nation. The last objective is best illustrated by a quote from the editors' introduction:

> Polish psychology is facing new problems, such as the role of consciousness in the production process, or the fight against the remnants of the old bourgeois consciousness, and the strengthening of the socialist view of the world, or the formation of the new man, a builder of socialism. ('Od Redakcji', 1952: iv)

The editors of *Przegląd Psychologiczny* also took up the ultimate challenge of developing a new psychology curriculum, the content of which would be free from 'the burden of the capitalist ideology'. The issue contained a proposal for the number of hours and courses to complete in each year of the envisaged psychology programme. The editors also announced the publication of the journal as a quarterly, which unfortunately did not become a reality due to the highly negative attitude of the communist authorities towards psychology. The process of 'arrest' commenced.

The first issue of *Przegląd Psychologiczny* opened with a flagship article by Tadeusz Tomaszewski titled 'The Methodological Crisis in Psychology'. Tadeusz Tomaszewski (1910–2000) studied Polish and psychology at Lvov under Kreutz. In 1938, he completed his PhD in psychology. In 1938–9, he conducted research under Henri Pieron in Paris. After World War Two, in 1947, he received the habilitation degree on the strength of his dissertation titled 'Kinds and Motives of Negative Reactions' and became head of general psychology at the University of Warsaw, where he served as dean of the Psychology and Education Faculty and head of the Psychology Department for many years. He authored psychology textbooks and developed the theory of actions, which dominated research in Poland in the 1960s and 1970s (see Rzepa, 1997). The source of the crisis, according to Tomaszewski, was the contradiction between the entirely new problems faced by psychology and the discipline's petrified, obsolete methods. His criticism targeted above all the representatives of the Lvov-Warsaw School, and in particular the psychology of consciousness developed by Kreutz.

The fundamental objection against Kreutz was his idealistic concept of science, which involved two forms of idealism: objective and subjective. The former – objective idealism – was deemed responsible for an approach in which the choice of focus depended on the internal logic of disciplinary development, disconnected from the social context, while subjective idealism was allegedly characterized by bourgeois liberalism, in which

the main motive behind the interest in particular issues was the researcher's subjective curiosity. Tomaszewski identified this approach to psychology's concerns in the pre-war concepts developed by the Lvov-Warsaw School. The new content of psychology was expressed primarily in its social function, which differed radically from the pre-war position prioritizing the inner experience of the individual. In Tomaszewski's opinion, there were social reasons behind this focus, because 'the goal was to neutralize the growing tendency of people to actively interfere with the course of events and to destroy their faith in the efficacy of such interventions. It was an ideological battle the bourgeoisie fought to maintain their tottering status quo' (Tomaszewski, 1952: 3).

In the period of building socialism, the themes and issues of psychology were to serve to recast human consciousness in order to make the individual ready to 'fight and build a new and better world' (Tomaszewski, 1952: 6). The methodological crisis originated from a mismatch between psychology's research methods and its themes and problems. Admittedly, before the war, some psychologists upholding bourgeois psychology, like Kreutz himself, had noticed its shortcomings – for example, regarding the issues it studied – but they had been unable to take any meaningful steps to address them. That was because the psychologists of the Lvov-Warsaw School – in Tomaszewski's opinion – focused on method while marginalizing the object of study. This led to the primacy of methodology over thematic research concerns and, in Tomaszewski's words, hampered the development of new psychology:

> The progress of science is better promoted when a problem of social relevance is studied, be it even clumsily and ineptly for a while, than when it is eliminated from research to sustain the fiction of methodological perfection. There is no other way to find new methods than attempting to solve new problems. (Tomaszewski, 1952: 11)

The two main methods that had contributed to the current crisis were the testing method and introspection. Through his criticism of these research methods, Tomaszewski turned his attack on the old psychology framework epitomized by Kreutz, his former teacher. In his Lvov days, Kreutz had critiqued the test method, citing the variability of test results as its particular deficiency, as we discussed above. But, for Tomaszewski, this was merely a 'rightist' critique unrelated to the shape of new psychology, and he concluded that Kreutz's aim had in fact been simply to pay lip service to the bourgeois methodology. Rather than seeking to eliminate tests, he had wanted to improve them. True criticism, attacking the false assumptions behind the testing method, had been presented in the resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party in 1936. This document had primarily emphasized the unscientific theoretical assumptions of tests underpinned by a concept of development based on hereditary and environmental invariants.

Tomaszewski (1952: 17) stressed what he considered the most important charge against the testing method: its 'politically reactionary function as a social tool for the strengthening of class and racial exploitation'. The most important argument against the testing method was, for Tomaszewski, its anti-dialectical nature, because

> in fact, dialectic is not viewed as a set of dogmas or a priori assumptions, but more as a method that facilitates the discovery of truth or perception of error where it would be more difficult to do so without it. Also, in our case, the rules of dialectics help evaluate the test methods properly and comprehend how they are actually related to reality. (ibid.: 18)

In his opinion, the negation of the laws of dialectics was expressed in the test-based research methodologies with their static conceptualization of reality, the one-sided, analytical nature of tests, and the distinction between quantitative changes and qualitative changes. The first point concerned the presupposition that mental dispositions were stable, which in Tomaszewski's opinion impeded the building of a new methodology that would prove false the thesis of the immutability of hereditary mental predispositions and, as he wrote, 'the alleged stability of the environment, which partially modifies them' (ibid.). In the dynamic conditions of developing socialism, the mass emergence of new talents was explicitly observable. This, according to Tomaszewski, was an example of the Marxist thesis of the variability of the environment and of psychological traits and dispositions.

The one-sidedly analytical nature of the tests contradicted the principles of dialectics, in particular, as Tomaszewski contended, the second principle of dialectics. This was seen in their separation of analysis and synthesis, as the tests studied one or another discrete feature in isolation from the *entire* personality, as a result of which mental dispositions seemed to function independently of each other. In the last step, criticism of the test methods denounced the purely quantitative nature of their findings, which reduced development to quantitative growth. Marxist psychologists could not accept this way of thinking, because they knew that quantitative changes transitioned into qualitative changes. In Tomaszewski's (1952: 21) assessment, 'As a tool, tests are absolutely incapable of revealing that basic property of all processes'. Therefore, any attempt to salvage the testing method, such as by introducing qualitive tests, would be pointless.

Having critiqued the old testing methodology, Tomaszewski revealed an even more drastic gap between the new issues and the research procedures used in psychology. Bourgeois psychology was based primarily on introspection, and all the shortcomings of this method would, he insisted, be brought to light by new issues studied by psychology. Tomaszewski admitted that behaviourists had criticized introspection, and yet, in his opinion, they had not ushered in any new focus in terms of new problems.

The critique was levelled primarily against Kreutz, whose work and ideas were discussed in the previous section. If, following Kreutz, a distinction was assumed between direct and indirect methods in psychology, then introspection was an example of the former. External observation, in turn, was an example of an indirect method. The difference between the two methods lay in the fact that through introspection one could know the unmediated mental reality, while in external observation sensory organs were used to know the outside world and, by extension, the existence of mental experiences.

The purpose of introspection was to distinguish different categories of mental phenomenon and to find certain patterns in mental phenomena. This model of psychology was unacceptable from the perspective of the new Marxist psychology, as Tomaszewski (1952: 24) insisted: 'This position corresponds, as we have said, very well to the needs of the dying middle class, but it does not correspond to reality'.

Tomaszewski's basic objection to introspection was that introspective data were related to the subjective world of feelings and experiences as dissociated from objective things and events. As a result, the difference between objects of inner experience and delusions was obliterated. Tomaszewski (1952: 27) summarized this in the following way: 'Such examples of the programmatic indifference of psychologists towards material reality can be found by the handful across the psychological literature from Wundt to Köhler'.

Introspection, therefore, was a shining example of a mismatch between the old methodology and the new problems, and, consequently, a source of crisis in psychology. Based on the goals of socialist science, the new pursuits of psychology were primarily intended to support the transformation of reality and the construction of a new human consciousness. This required developing a new methodology, not in the sense of replacing introspection with a more objective external observation, but in the sense of designing entirely new methods of research untainted by the idealistic model of science.

Tomaszewski listed two general rules for this new methodology. One was to focus on the content of mental phenomena, because every mental experience was a reflection of material reality. The other was for the Marxist materialist methodology to study the link between psychological phenomena and actions, considering the indisputable fact that 'to understand human actions one must recognize that they are an external manifestation of how the agent subjectively represents reality' (Tomaszewski, 1952: 34). The conclusion of Tomaszewski's article reiterated his general points about producing a new methodology to put an end to the crisis in psychology. The problem was that Tomaszewski did not exactly present any methods that could replace the discredited 'bourgeois' forms of research on the human mind.

The present: Soviet psychology as an ideal model

The ultimate goal was achieved by demonstrating the utter bankruptcy of the old psychology. The new horizons of the science reached by Soviet psychologists were intended to become a model of what the new psychology should be. In the first issue of *Przegląd Psychologiczny*, Tomaszewski's article discussed above was followed by three articles on Soviet psychology. These all criticized Western psychology, denouncing the fact that it was considered the only correct form of the development of the discipline. One of these articles was written by Polish psychologist Józef Reutt, who had studied psychology and philosophy at the University of Vilnius and at the Sorbonne in Paris. He completed his university education in 1931, submitting a thesis titled 'On the Theory of Emotions in Spinoza'. He submitted his doctoral dissertation at the secret University of the Western Lands in Warsaw during the German occupation. In 1945, just after the war, he obtained a PhD in psychology at the University of Poznań. Reutt's subsequent academic career centred on Lublin, where he initially took over the chair of psychology at the Catholic University of Lublin and, from 1956 onwards, chaired the Department of General Psychology at the University of Lublin. In the 1940s and 1950s, his research was focused on will and hesitation. Later, he turned to projective tests, in particular on the thematic apperception test (TAT). Reutt developed a Polish version of this test. In his 1952 article titled 'The Psychology of Will in Soviet Science', he insisted that

> Soviet psychology is monistic and materialistic. Western psychology is represented by all sorts of philosophical movements, from the extremely materialistic ones, in which mental phenomena are reduced to physical phenomena, to dualistic ones, which not only recognize that mental phenomena are different from physical phenomena, but also emphasize an overall distinctiveness of these two types of phenomena. (Reutt, 1952: 58)

A stronger emphasis on the superiority of the Marxist-Leninist concept of psychology can be found in an article by the Soviet scholar W. Kołbanowski titled 'Personality Psychology in the Works of A. S. Makarenko', in which previous approaches to personality in psychology are identified as 'reactionary rubbish of the like of pseudo-sciences' (Kołbanowski, 1952). N. B. Levitov, the author of 'Issues in Personality Psychology', claimed that only in the social conditions created in the USSR could personality take on truly human traits. This was because Soviet society promoted full personality development by meeting all personal human needs. This fostered an increased awareness of one's role in historical and social transformations and thereby enabled one to actively shape one's own destiny.

In these transformations, the Soviet man was assisted by psychology, the object of which, according to Levitov, was to develop personality as defined in true Marxist-Leninist teachings. This provided the scientific basis lacking in contemporary Western research on personality. As Levitov (1952: 145) pithily insisted:

> All theories of personality developed by bourgeois psychologists reveal the same deficiency: replacing a living historical personality with an artificial construct. Idealistic metaphysics inherent in these theories borders here on a rough, mechanistic approach to exploring the psychology of personality, as well as on narrowly practical empiricism.

Furthermore, he exposed the real purpose of the bourgeois personality theory:

> Ultimately, personality is created artificially, and the science of personality is assessed not in terms of its utility to influence human personality, but in terms of its effectiveness in shaping a personality that serves the interests of the ruling classes of bourgeois society. (ibid.)

According to Kołbanowski, the individualism prevalent in such a society doomed an individual to tragic loneliness, and its moral law was founded on the principles of selfishness. Genuine freedom, in contrast, was underpinned by the genuine dialectical unity of society and the individual. These assumptions gave rise to A. S. Makarenko's pedagogical theory, with the collective as its key concept. The objective of education was for the individual to be educated by the collective, which exercised educational and disciplinary functions to subsume him/her and protect his/her fundamental interests. Makarenko articulated the following idea of education: 'In the Soviet Union, there can be no individual outside of the collective, and, therefore, one's personal fate and personal path to personal happiness cannot be separated from society, as opposing the collective fate and collective happiness' (Makarenko, quoted in Kołbanowski, 1952: 118). For this reason, the psychology of personality needed above all to become a science that

transformed personality. The mechanism underlying the transformation of human personality was will, as this helped forge the character of the Soviet man. The unity of will and action was touted in declarations such as 'The Soviet Union, where a communist society is being built, particularly needs people of strong will, people capable of systematic, planned and sustained effort' (Kairov, quoted in Reutt, 1952: 60).

The definition of will developed in Soviet psychology emphasized conscious activities resulting from voluntary processes. Only a conscious goal was believed to be able to sustain actions stemming from will. An important element of Soviet psychology was the study of the development of will processes. One of its important frameworks was Rubinstein's concept, which held that human will arose as a result of changes in individual–environment relations. It began with mastering one's impulses – or rather with the realization of this limitation – followed by overcoming them and, finally, breaking away from the restraining fetters of desire. Of course, Rubinstein also emphasized the role of society, in which there existed division of labour. An individual manufactured objects to meet the needs of other members of society. This meant that

> the process of social life leads to the emergence of the social good and values, which come forth as already objectified values, i.e. detached from the impulses of the individual. And as in the process of social life objectified values again become personal values for individuals, they also become their personal goals. (Rubinstein, quoted in Reutt, 1952: 74)

However, this approach towards the will was not entirely consistent with the principles of Marxism-Leninism, and, therefore, Rubinstein's theory was criticized for failing to indicate clearly that all internal states were a reflection of an objective reality. Equally unacceptable was the adoption of the concept of libido as a source of the formation of the will. Critics of this concept considered it a manifestation of idealism in psychology (Reutt, 1952).

The most important aspect of the will concept in Soviet psychology was locating the motives driving human will in the communist world view: 'In Soviet people these motives should come first; they should be essential and should determine all their conduct. Therefore, the formation of these motives is the most important purpose of the Soviet education system' (Reutt, 1952: 76).

To sum up, among the most important aspects of new psychology as developed by Soviet psychologists was the break it represented with the entire former tradition of psychology, considered to have been devised for the benefit of the bourgeoisie and, consequently, focusing on issues relevant to the goals and ideas of the ruling class. True psychology based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism was instead to serve the working class in order to shape human personalities capable of fighting for the lofty ideals of communism.

The present: Psychology or ideology? The 1952 psychology curriculum proposal

The university psychology curriculum outlined in the first issue of *Przegląd Psychologiczny* ('Od Redakcji', 1952) was intended to reform the previous psychology

programmes, and, most importantly, to provide the discipline with philosophical and historical underpinnings. Accordingly, three basic cornerstones of psychology were defined. The first and most important was to anchor psychology in the principles of dialectical materialism, which is why the proposed curriculum included a two-year course in dialectical materialism and historical materialism, including lectures and tutorials. The idea was that, in future, psychologists should take a decisive ideological stance (ibid.).

Another important feature of the new psychological education was a solid social grounding, without which a psychologist would be completely lost in reality. This involved adding courses in historical materialism, economic history, and social and political economy. The third pillar was provided by the natural sciences, represented by physiology, physics, and anatomy. This was also reflected in the distribution of courses and workload across the regular psychology programme. In its first three years, eight and three hours of lectures per week were planned, respectively, for modules in these subject areas. All of this was intended to promote the development of materialistic psychology, viewed as a valuable acquisition ushering psychology into the realm that Tomaszewski called the '*summa scientiarum*'.

The principles of the new psychology curriculum were, in conclusion, motivated as follows:

> The efforts to found psychology on these three cornerstones are warranted by the Marxist-Leninist view on the object and aims of psychology. In this perspective, mental life, comprehension and explanation of which is the mission of psychology, is a product of a highly organized matter, and its function in the organism's life is to reflect external reality. (Żebrowska, 1952: 38)

The new curriculum also included courses in psychology, such as general psychology, developmental psychology, and educational psychology, with the requirement that the coursework content must reflect the new Marxist psychology. The policy and goals of the curriculum and the objectives of psychological education presented in the first issue of *Przegląd Psychologiczny* leave hardly any doubt about the primacy of ideology over knowledge and professional psychological competence. Only by taking a proper ideological stance could a psychologist best serve the needs of the emerging socialist society.

The present: The symbolic arrest of psychology, 1952–6

Psychologists' declared commitment to rebuilding the discipline in the spirit of dialectical materialism and to emulating the model of Soviet psychology were to no avail. In the second half of 1952, a process was launched implementing what we call the symbolic arrest. Information on the specific measures taken by government agents against psychologists and the structure that supported the discipline comes from material in the archives of the National Council of Psychologists from 1957. The resources were published in the second issue of *Przegląd Psychologiczny*, which appeared after a six-year break. Its 'Note From the Editors' stated that the journal could now be published due to recent political changes.

What this meant, of course, was the end of Stalinism and the onset of transformations within the Communist Party, with power seized by the faction that wanted changes in Poland. The time had come to disclose the ubiquitous abuses of the previous period in Poland. The National Conference of Psychologists held on 9–10 February 1957 in Warsaw also worked towards this goal. The psychologists could finally comment on recent years; voices of harsh criticism prevailed, and astonishment was expressed that such a situation had been possible at all in post-war Poland. The attendees said that

> in comparison with other disciplines – in spite of their errors and distortions – psychology after the war was particularly obstructed in its development and expansion. Almost all departments of applied psychology were closed down, and their employees disqualified *without a court ruling*. (Schiller, 1958: 189; emphasis added)

'If some departments withstood that general purge, their existence was almost conspiratorial'. It was also said that 'to admit at the time that one was a psychologist was an embarrassing confession and an act of considerable courage tantamount to a voluntary subjection to infamy' (ibid.).

The government proceeded very rapidly and, as already mentioned, without any prior notice. Yet in February 1952, *Przegląd Psychologiczny* was published, in which all articles and the draft of the psychology curriculum were in line with dialectical materialism. This turned out not to be enough to save psychology, and the process of destroying psychology-related institutions and pursuits began.

The first stage of the eradication of psychology was the abolition of university research and education in psychology. Almost all departments that educated psychologists were disbanded. For example, in Wrocław, Professor Kreutz was transferred by a decree from the minister of higher education dated 28 October 1952 to Warsaw, where only the Institute of General Psychology at the University of Warsaw survived. In this way, the establishment of a psychology programme at Wrocław was completely blocked. At other universities, where students had already enrolled in psychology programmes (e.g. in Poznań), admissions were suspended for the following academic year. The measures taken to 'arrest psychology' were approved by the government, and were always accompanied by a specific decree. What this meant for the further development of psychology in Poland was best summed up by Kreutz (1958: 200), when he commented at the 1958 Conference of Psychologists:

> Today, the staffing levels are atrocious. Psychologists who have some meaningful research to show for them are few and far between, and a third of them are elderly people, in their sixties, of whom intensive work can no longer be demanded. Many psychologists suffered a breakdown in that time.

Publication of all psychology journals was suspended, and libraries withdrew books on psychology. In Kreutz's (1958) words, a 'total emptiness' came to pass. Similar policies were pursued against applied psychology – from shutting down educational counselling facilities to terminating psychologists' positions at medical centres.

The future: Amnesty for psychology after 1956

Political changes that took place after 1956, in a process symbolically named the Thaw, meant that psychology again assumed its rightful place at Polish universities. The return of psychology provoked questions about what had actually happened from 1952 to 1956 and what lesson should be learned from those events. Of course, the ensuing debates were not entirely free, as despite the Thaw, preventive censorship was still being applied, and the role of communist ideology, though somewhat limited, was still immense. However, psychologists, including the protagonists of our story, tried to answer these questions.

The question of why things had happened the way they had could hardly receive an unequivocal answer, and in 1958 Kreutz seemed to realize this, as he said he hoped that, in the future, historians of science would disentangle the 'enormously complicated network of various causes' (1958: 201). One of those causes was some psychologists' attitude and conduct, but, as already mentioned, their seeking to ingratiate themselves with the regime by criticizing pre-war psychology and emulating Soviet psychology in their research proved to be an insufficient explanation. Kreutz also believed that blaming individuals alone would be a treacherous oversimplification. In this perspective, Tomaszewski's explanation for why he had taken the position described above was rather telling. Taking the floor during the Conference of Psychologists, he began by saying:

> The problems of man are gaining more and more recognition. Up to now they have not appeared either in literature, or in economics, or in education. Now we are beginning to speak of human affairs, to which 'our conference' is also dedicated. (Sprawozdanie, 1958: 212)

Later in his speech, when talking about assessing the past, Tomaszewski said that his name was associated with the former period, but his views represented a continuous line of interest. He was interested in Soviet psychology, which is why he had written about it and would continue to do so. In reviewing his colleagues' work, he had been guided only by their scholarly value and had never taken into account their political leanings. His mistake, which he publicly admitted, had been accepting the position of an official psychologist, as, in his own words, 'taking official posts is a compromise in science' (Sprawozdanie, 1958: 212). However, he believed the allegations against him of hurting people and of acting against others to be unfair and harmful, because he did not feel in any way responsible for the losses that psychology had incurred at that time. Nobody had lost their job, and no psychological facility had been closed down.

Individual responsibility for the recent past was addressed by Minister Władysław Bieńkowski, a philosopher, sociologist, and government representative, who after the changes in 1956 had taken the helm of the Ministry of Education. At the beginning of his speech, Bieńkowski presented the government's declaration that the full rights of psychology would be restored in teaching and education.[3] He also talked about the role of science, emphasizing that its purpose was to contribute to the heritage of humanity, which knew no geographic limits. Summarizing what had happened in Poland, he said, 'We have opened the windows wide to the world. This is an achievement we must take

advantage of' (Sprawozdanie, 1958: 209). However, he also admitted that when listening to the debates of psychologists, he was surprised by how often personal grudges were voiced.

Indeed, several years later at the 20th anniversary of the communist regime, *Przegląd Psychologiczny* included an article by Włodzimierz Szewczuk titled 'Ideological Changes in Polish Psychology During the 20 Years of the People's Republic of Poland', in which the period 1949–56 was appraised as a time of struggles for a new psychology. These struggles had sometimes been very dramatic indeed, but ultimately

> everything that had been bad in those days was fittingly assessed after the breakthrough. Still, some nevertheless believed that everything had been bad in that period, and were ready to discard the wheat with the chaff, in short, to get rid of Marxist philosophy altogether, to return to the ideal of pure science. We know what this meant. (Szewczuk, 1965: 10)

Szewczuk was one of those psychologists who defended at least the rudiments of communist ideology and its relevance to psychology as a science, even in the altered conditions. Indeed, attempts to ideologize psychology did not cease, though they were hardly comparable with what had happened in the years 1952–6. Psychology in Poland in the years 1956–89 was able to engage in a creative dialogue with Western psychology, inscribing itself into the mainstream of theoretical and empirical research. Moreover, Polish psychologists were able to take advantage of good relations with psychologists in the Soviet Union to draw on their indisputable findings, especially in neuropsychology and developmental psychology, and also to bring some of this work to the attention of Western psychologists. The most eminent of Polish psychologists were capable of creatively synthesizing both currents by developing original psychological concepts. An excellent case in point is the world-renowned notion of temperament developed by Jan Strelau (2008).

Generally, our story seems to offer an optimistic moral. Years of ideological oppression were followed by the Thaw and the thriving of psychology in Poland. However, we believe this would be a simplified reading of what happened to Polish psychology in the years 1952–6. Crucially, both the arrest and the amnesty of psychology came from the outside and were external to the discipline itself. Psychologists responded in one way or another to the external political climate, forming their opinions based on it. It is not the task of historians to speculate about what could have been, but it does not require any special level of insight to conclude that if it had not been for the political Thaw in 1956, Polish psychology would have cut quite a different figure. Kreutz was right when writing about a complex combination of different causes. One of these was seeking to ingratiate oneself with the authorities, while another was certainly personal ambition mixed with the belief that a radical social change was needed and could be achieved by imitating the Soviet Union. Awareness of how complex the situation was and the difficulty of assessing the motivations behind the behaviours displayed by scientists involved in those discussions certainly contributed to the restraint and self-control with which participants in those events later described the difficult years.

The fortunes and misfortunes of psychology in Poland after World War Two seem to imply that the history of a discipline results from interactions of external – primarily

cultural and political – factors and an internal rhythm of the development of the discipline. The case of Polish psychology, as analysed above, strongly suggests that the development of this particular discipline has followed a non-linear trajectory. One case is certainly not enough to corroborate any more general conclusions, but it amply suggests that, even in difficult periods, dialogue at least to a limited extent, is achievable among scholars. This augments the cognitive resources of psychology and, by extension, of any other discipline of the humanities and the social sciences, always prone to ideological pressures. That this is indeed possible is seen in the ultimately optimistic ending to our story. In this sense, its moral may have wider implications. Although totalitarian states exemplify the exertion of ideological pressure on science, democratic societies also produce all kinds of external pressures science and scholarship must cope with. A grand social experiment involving the foundation of the communist regime and its impact on science and scholarship can serve as a lens that usefully magnifies the real situation and the workings of science and scholarship vis-a-vis political and social forces that affect them from outside.

Declaration of conflicting interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Leszek Koczanowicz https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4204-1674

Notes

All translations from the Polish are the authors' own.

1. The *Lvov-Warsaw School* designates an intellectual institution centred around Kazimierz Twardowski (1866–1938), a philosopher, psychologist, and methodologist, who took up the chair of philosophy at Lvov in 1895 and lived to see many of his students become involved in a variety of disciplines, such as psychology, pedagogy, methodology, philosophy, and mathematical logic. According to Jan Woleński, the Lvov-Warsaw School can be defined based on different criteria: genetic (i.e. Twardowski's research and teaching); geographic (based in Lvov, and, after Poland regained independence in 1918, also in Warsaw); time frame (the end of the 19th century to World War Two); and the most important factor – the pool of common ideas. The Lvov-Warsaw School is best known for its scholars' work on logic and analytic philosophy (Tarski, Leśniewski, Kotarbiński), but it also included distinguished psychologists, such as Władysław Witwicki and our article's protagonist, Mieczysław Kreutz, who became head of psychology at the University of Lvov in 1928 (see Woleński, 1985).
2. Kreutz's personal file, Wrocław University Archives, DK-II-3a-3912/5.
3. The Ministry of Education decided in 1957 to re-establish psychology as a major at Poznań, Cracow, and Warsaw. At Wrocław, however, it was not established as a major until 1967.

References

Amsterdamski, S. (1989) 'O patologii życia naukowego: Casus Łysenko' [On the Pathology of Scientific Life: Lysenko's Case], *Przegląd Powszechny* 4: 61–86.

Apołczyn, L. (1938) 'Metoda Rorschacha: technika eksperymentów. Z przedmową prof. M. Kreutza' [The Rorschach Method: An Experimental Technique. With an Introduction by Prof. M. Kreutz], *Psychologia Wychowawcza* 11: 27–37.

Ash, M. G. (1995) *Gestalt Psychology in German Culture 1890-1967: Holism and the Quest for Objectivity*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Błachowski, S. (1947) 'Po ośmiu latach' [Eight Years Later], *Kwartalnik Psychologiczny* 13: vi–xv.

Bratus, B. (2011) 'Obraz człowieka w psychologii rosyjskiej od Rewolucji 1917r. do drugiej wojny światowej' [The Image of Man in Russian Psychology From the 1917 Revolution to World War Two], in W. Zeidler and H. Lück (eds) *Psychologia europejska w okresie międzywojennym* [European Psychology in the Interwar Period]. Warsaw: Vizja Press & IT, pp. 17–25.

Chmielewski, A. and Koczanowicz, L. (1997) 'The Conditions of Philosophy in Poland', *Metaphilosophy* 28(4): 404–16.

Danziger, K. (1990) *Constructing the Subject: Historical Origins of Psychological Research*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Danziger, K. (1994) 'Does the History of Psychology Have a Future?', *Theory & Psychology* 4: 467–84.

Danziger, K. (1997) *Naming the Mind: How Psychology Found Its Language*. London: SAGE.

Dybel, P. (2016) *Psychoanaliza – ziemia obiecana? Dzieje psychoanalizy w Polsce 1900–1989* [Psychoanalysis – The Promised Land? The History of Psychoanalysis in Poland, 1900–89]. Cracow: Universitas.

Furumoto, L. (1989) 'The New History of Psychology', in I. S. Cohen (ed.) *The G. Stanley Hall Lecture Series: Vol. 9*. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, pp. 9–34.

Furumoto, L. (1995) 'On Textbook History of Psychology and Scientizing History', *Psychological Inquiry* 6(2): 124–6.

Geuter, U. (1992) *The Professionalization of Psychology in Nazi Germany*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Graham, L. R. (1987) *Science, Philosophy and Human Behavior in the Soviet Union*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

Graham, L. R. (1993) *Science in Russia and the Soviet Union: A Short History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ingarden, R. (1947) 'O poznawaniu cudzych stanów psychicznych' [On Knowing Other People's Mental States], *Kwartalnik Psychologiczny* 13: 1–27.

Josephson, P. R. (1988) 'Science Policy in the Soviet Union, 1917-1927', *Minerva* 26(3): 342–69.

Jovanović, G. (2015) 'Vygotsky in His, Our and Future Times', *History of the Human Sciences* 28(2): 3–7.

Kołbanowski, W. (1952) 'Psychologia osobowości w utworach A.S. Makarenki' [Personality Psychology in the Works of A. S. Makarenko], *Przegląd Psychologiczny* 1: 114–33.

Krementsov, N. and deJong-Lambert, W. (2017) '"Lysenkoism" Redux: Introduction', in W. deJong-Lambert and N. Krementsov (eds) *The Lysenko Controversy as a Global*

Phenomenon: Vol. 1. Genetics and Agriculture in the Soviet Union and Beyond. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 1–34.

Kreutz, M. (1938) 'Przedmowa. Metoda Rorschacha: technika eksperymentów' [Introduction: Rorschach's Method: Experimental Technique], *Psychologia Wychowawcza* 11: 27–8.

Kreutz, M. (1949) *Podstawy psychologii* [Foundations of Psychology]. Warsaw: Nasza Księżnica.

Kreutz, M. (1958) 'Wnioski ogólne' [General Conclusions], *Przegląd Psychologiczny* 2: 199–203.

Kusch, M. (1999) *Psychological Knowledge: A Social History and Philosophy*. London: Routledge.

Lecourt, D. (2003[1977]) *Proletarian Science: The Case of Lysenko*, trans. B. Brewster. London: NLB.

Levitov, N. D. (1952) 'Zagadnienia psychologii osobowości' [Issues in Personality Psychology], *Przegląd Psychologiczny* 1: 134–55.

Mandler, G. (2008) *A History of Modern Experimental Psychology: From James and Wundt to Cognitive Science*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

'Od Redakcji' [Editorial] (1952) *Przegląd Psychologiczny* 1: iii–v.

Pollock, E. (2006) *Stalin and the Soviet Science Wars*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Reutt, J. (1947) 'Przedstawienie celu a postępowanie' [The Definition of Goal vs. Behaviour], *Kwartalnik Psychologiczny* 13: 59–156.

Reutt, J. (1952) 'Psychologia woli w nauce radzieckiej' [The Psychology of Will in Soviet Science], *Przegląd Psychologiczny* 1: 58–112.

Richards, G. (1987) 'Of What Is History of Psychology a History?', *British Journal for the History of Science* 2: 201–11.

Richards, G. (2010) *Putting Psychology in Its Place* (3rd ed.). London: Routledge.

Rzepa, T., ed. (1997) *Psychologia w szkole lwowsko-warszawskiej* [Psychology in the Lvov-Warsaw School]. Warsaw: PWN.

Schiller, I. (1958) 'Zadania psychologii stosowanej w sztuce' [The Tasks of Applied Psychology in the Arts], *Przegląd Psychologiczny* 2: 189–98.

Smith, R. (1988) 'Does the History of Psychology Have a Subject?', *History of the Human Sciences* 1(2): 147–77.

Smith, R. (1997) *The Norton History of the Human Sciences*. New York, NY: W. W. Norton.

Sprawozdanie z dyskusji Krajowej Narady Psychologów [Report of National Meeting of Psychologists] (1958), *Przegląd Psychologiczny* 2: 145–238.

Strelau, J. (2008) *Temperament as a Regulator of Behavior: After Fifty Years of Research*. Clinton Corners, NY: Eliot Werner Publications.

Szewczuk, W. (1965) 'Przemiany ideologiczne w polskiej psychologii w okresie dwudziestolecia PRL' [Ideological Changes in Polish Psychology During the 20 Years of the People's Republic of Poland], *Przegląd Psychologiczny* 10: 5–16.

Tomaszewski, T. (1947) 'O psychologii w Z.S.R.R' [On Psychology in the Soviet Union], *Kwartalnik Psychologiczny* 13: 267–315.

Tomaszewski, T. (1952) 'Kryzys metodologiczny w psychologii' [The Methodological Crisis in Psychology], *Przegląd Psychologiczny* 1: 1–36.

Woleński, J. (1985) *Filozoficzna szkoła lwowsko-warszawska* [The Lvov-Warsaw School of Philosophy]. Warsaw: PWN.

Zaworski, T. (1947) 'Akustyczne wyobrażenia ejdetyczne' [Acoustic Eidetic Representations], *Kwartalnik Psychologiczny* 13: 156–204.

Żebrowska, M. (1952) 'Problemy organizacyjne i naukowe studiów psychologicznych' [Organizational and Scientific Issues in Psychology Degree Programmes], *Przegląd Psychologiczny* 1: 36–57.

Author biographies

Leszek Koczanowicz is a professor at the SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities, specializing in social and cultural theory. He is the author and editor of 12 books and numerous articles in Polish and English. His most recent publication is *Anxiety and Lucidity: Reflections on Culture in Times of Unrest* (Routledge, 2020).

Iwona Koczanowicz-Dehnel is an assistant professor in the Department of Psychology at Wrocław University. Her research focuses on the history of psychological thought and the philosophical fundamentals of psychology. She has published two monographs: *Jak powstała psychologia* (How Psychology Emerged; Wydawnictwo DSW, 2004) and *William Stern w perspektywie nowej historii psychologii* (William Stern in the Perspective of the New History of Psychology; Wydawnictwo Scholar, 2017).